

A Critical Overview on Music Education as Aesthetic Education in Light of the Original Intention of the Aesthetic Philosophy*

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Drawing on the current condition of aesthetic education as a philosophy of music education, this paper proposes a comprehensive overview that analyzes the original characteristics of aesthetic judgment in terms of the philosophical system. The author then considers the educational implications of this philosophical direction following the initial intention of aesthetic education, which forms the topical stream in the current debate about the philosophy of music education. Accordingly, this article argues that aesthetic education has emanated from Kant's critical philosophy, and later interpretations of it appear to be a divergence from the primary design.

※ key words : philosophy of music education, aesthetic education, aesthetic philosophy, Schiller, Kant

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* This study was supported by a research grant from Gwangju National University of Education in 2014.

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I . Introduction

Today, music educators pursue to find a reason why we need qualified musical activities in our society. Music education notably in schools should meet with public approval in terms of justification. The functional efficiency of music education refers not only to micro level but also to macro one. The latter is related to philosophical thinking about it. An inevitable question is what kind of role any musical mind or behavior plays in our life.

Current literature on this field treats often aesthetic approach as an essential factor of music education. So, we need to give consideration to the aesthetic function in a philosophical system which would potentialize educational justification of music. In this respect, the essential intention of initial aesthetics is worth examining. The purpose of this study is to highlight original viewpoints on aesthetic philosophy as well as on aesthetic education, and to expose diversions and disagreements in this field from the venerable insights of their original intention.

This paper is limited to consideration of the initial philosophical approaches of Baumgarten, Kant, and Schiller. To fully understand these philosophical approaches, it is necessary to clarify the relation between aesthetics and education by discussing the scope of the system of aesthetic philosophy that brings aesthetics to bear on educational ends. Then, some critical points in recent trends in the philosophy of music education are discussed.

Certainly, there have been studies that have considered this problem, but little acknowledgement has been made of the initial conception of aesthetic judgment in the area of music education. Despite the rise of the argument about aesthetic education as a philosophy of music education, few have attempted to address its philosophical origin.

II. The present condition of aesthetic education in music education

In 1958 researchers introduced the notion of “the philosophical range” of music, implementing the use of philosophical thinking in music education. These researchers used words like idealism, naturalism, pragmatism, realism, etc. (Henry, 1958, pp. 30, 63, 132–135). However, this usage seems not to have resonated much with later publications. The book *Foundations and Principles of Music Education* (Leonhard & House, 1959, 1972) emphasized aesthetic experience in the chapter on philosophical foundations. In the publication *Foundation of Music Education* (Abeles, Hoffer, & Klotman 1994), the writers briefly introduce ways of thinking such as rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism, and used some aesthetical viewpoints for listening to art music. Mark (1982, p. 18) expressed his interpretation of current philosophical thinking for music education, describing an evolutionary progression from utilitarian music education to aesthetic. Alperson’s (1991) article “What Should One Expect from a Philosophy of Music Education” provided a significant overview of this field although he remains more cautious in establishing a boundary for the philosophy of music education. In all, the most common philosophical argument for the necessity of music education is an appeal to aesthetic education (Alperson 1991, pp. 219, 221).

Aesthetic education is a familiar topic in music education today especially since there is substantial debate between scholars has emerged (See representative statements: Elliott, 1989, 1997; Reimer, 1990, 1996; Alperson, 1991; Gates et al., 2000). The expression of the term “music education as aesthetic education” emerged in English literature only gradually (Schwadron, 1988, p. 96; McCarthy & Goble, 2005, p. 20). Reimer’s argument about the direction of aesthetic education is grounded in the basis introduced in the mid-1950s during its infancy (2009, p. 15). *Basic Concepts in Music Education, The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of National Society for the Study of Education* (Henry, 1958) is considered to be the most significant publication for music education during that period, and it generated initial concerns about

this movement. The term “aesthetic education” does not appear in this book, but some phrases like “aesthetic growth” or “aesthetic control” are observed as well as “aesthetic experience.” One of the initial uses of the term “aesthetic education” in music education literature appears in Leonhard’s contribution about “Music Education–Aesthetic Education” (1953, p. 23), and accordingly in the above mentioned *Foundations and Principles of Music Education* (1959, p. 100).

Therefore, the term aesthetic education was beginning to be used frequently in “art education” in English educational literature: for example, since 1966 *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* authors have use this term. Yet, the meaning of aesthetic education shows diversity in its range or structure, as Reimer (2003) confesses (p. 10). One of the major causes would be change in the understanding of “aesthetics.” A major assumption is consequently that art is related to aesthetics. However, aesthetic education does not tend to restrict its scope to art. Of course, a term does not stay static but dynamically evolves. However, concerns about the vulnerability of aesthetic education in practice regarding what is philosophically intended with this concept will ultimately determine what is practiced; it is this link, which remains open for research.

Before exploring this topic in detail, it is useful to first look at the literal meaning of “aesthetic education.” This term as a compound of aesthetic and education, as does the term “music education” (compare with Elliott 1995, pp. 12–13), has basically two semantic aspects depending on which of components is emphasized. The issue is one of priority. First, education would acquire aesthetical aspects in order to improve any non-aesthetic achievement, e.g. morals or political values. In other words, general educational goals can be reached more efficiently by using aesthetic approaches. Second, aesthetics should be educational to enhance its value. That is to say, aesthetic activities would become more vital through or by educational goals and methods. The former implies a kind of education in which aesthetic viewpoints and principles play a significant role in instructing students. The latter may result in a kind of education in which aesthetics serves as the main educational content in the reality for educating artists or lovers of arts. The debate is concerned with

which part of this combination will take priority over the other. In contrast with music education (instead of “musical’ education”), aesthetic education should not be the kind of education for aesthetics because the word “aesthetic” in aesthetic education operates as an adjective. Rather, it should be the kind of education that uses aesthetic concepts and ideas. Therefore, we have to examine the genesis and meaning of aesthetics in philosophy and then its eventual connection with education.

III. A value-oriented design of aesthetics in philosophy

1. Aesthetic cognition as a comprehensive process

Aesthetics has been connected to sensory stimulation and its meaningful reflection since Baumgarten (1750) introduced this word into the philosophical discussion. According to him, aesthetics is analogous with reason. It is the sub-realm of our cognitional system as related to our faculty of sensory cognition (Baumgarten, 1750, §1). Therefore, aesthetics is a study or theory about sensory cognition that does not reject or escape its logic partner, although Baumgarten distinguishes the aesthetic approach from the logical one. According to Baumgarten, logical cognition has an intensive clarity and aesthetic cognition has an extensive clarity. It is understood that the aesthetic concerns the descending imagination whereas logic complies with the ascending abstraction (1758, §752-§755). If there were no intentionality of aesthetic operation, we may not know where our sensory cognition might be led.

Baumgarten (1750, §423-§444) marks this as aesthetic truth differing from logical truth. The aesthetic truth requires possibilities of objective matters, and such possibilities are not only absolute but also conditional. The absolute possibility concerns the sensory recognition of the object itself. The conditional

possibility has two dimensions, namely, natural and moral. In particular, the moral possibility of the aesthetic truth is relative to the personal dimension as well as to objective matters projected by freedom (§431-§435). In any case, each possibility pursues an entity, namely the aesthetic entity (§439).

Consequently, it is no wonder that the goal of aesthetics is the perfection of sensory cognition, which is called “beauty” (Baumgarten, 1750, §14). Insofar as phenomenal beauty constitutes the subjective imagination of the individual, it is not embedded in an object but in the imagination of the perceiving agent. For this reason, the ideal beauty of sensory cognition will emerge through three aspects of accordance: The beauty of things and the mind, the beauty of order, and the beauty of the description (§18-§20).

However, in his system, isolating perception from reason does not make sense because logical meaning belongs to reason. An aesthetic approach must find a way to be an integrated one. This perspective forms the keystone of the whole building of aesthetics. Nevertheless if beauty remained on its island, Baumgarten would not identify several classes of aesthetic truth. Many artists would only have absolute beauty functioning merely as a starting point. Baumgarten, however, having situated the aesthetic pursuit of truth and the aesthetic light in the latter part of his work, has received relatively little attention from art educators, even in the critical literature on music education. For Baumgarten, aesthetics consists not only of what is beauty, but also how beauty works. So, it is understandable that its members project beauty within society. Aesthetic freedom is the basic impulse, but it cannot constitute any social meaning by itself.

Perhaps because of the relation to reason, Baumgarten (1750, §281) describes the sublime, which still belongs to aesthetic process, as a way of thinking, elevating it to the next stage beyond the beautiful, thereby setting up aesthetic-logical truth (1758, §440, §566). Hence, aesthetics, which Baumgarten constructs even as he reveals it, is originally a science of sensory cognition even though it looks like an abstract conception of beauty, merely the imagined result of human beings’ perception.

Baumgarten’s discussion of aesthetics advances its meaning from a literal

one to a philosophical one. That is, it involved a system of ideas. Since the advent of aesthetics, scholars have proceeded to objective arguments about art. If, however, there were no philosophical system for the concept of aesthetics and its objective criteria, we would not need its philosophical value. That people should be educated to improve their sensory capability would be, in a larger view, nothing more than a premise in the argument that we have to educate the next generation well. As Baumgarten shows, the significance of sensory, artistic activity or any similar behavior could be considered a meaningful one only by taking the whole cognitional system into account.

After the emergence of aesthetics, not only artists but also scholars in the field often tended to abstract aesthetic experience from the philosophical system. In the area of music, aesthetics occasionally symbolized a wholly autonomous realm, especially in the nineteenth century. For example, Hanslick, who prominently contributed to the development of formalism in music education, failed to introduce a philosophical system because aimless perceptual activity does not make sense and human beings accordingly would not understand it. Hanslick claims each genre of art has to sustain its inherent content. In Hanslick's view, music should possess something musical as its uniqueness that is so-called "sounding forms being moved" (Hanslick, (1854) 1858, p. 38), i.e. the sounding form can provide intentional content as itself. Although Hanslick gives us an example of a composed piece, what he defines as music could certainly include non-recorded or unwritten music because music should not be just notes or scores, but sounding forms.

It might be that Hanslick tries to connect and reconcile the three aspects of Baumgarten's triangle. The connective, in his opinion, would be musical formality. The significance of the musical mind, order, and description might lead to the formal abstraction of music or diverge from it. However, in a narrower and original sense, aesthetic cognition is a mental activity that concerns not only the formal beauty of music but also the effort to find and form the meaning of music. Any attempt to separate the aesthetic region from the whole field of human beings may not justify the educational value of music. This is because such isolation insulates art from organic unity with the

whole world.

The educational value of music in public education comes from the social context because human beings are social beings. Hence, we need a moral approach for aesthetics that is obliged to connect with human values. Although virtue and morality are not essential parts of aesthetic cognition and appear only occasionally (Baumgarten, 1750, §211), it is unavoidable that a certain combination of the aforementioned will occur. Baumgarten's initial description of aesthetics did not ignore the benefit that aesthetic matters provide in the practice of daily life (1750, §3). However, Baumgarten may have persisted in promoting a dichotomous structure by not aligning aesthetics with unitary human cognition, which compelled Kant to establish a more organic system.

The appearance of aesthetics as a separate study in philosophy contributed two things. First, the formation of a value is not driven only by logic. Human judgment consequently needs the channel of sensory cognition. Second, the sensory cognition on which artistic pursuit is based has a mostly equal and alternative position to a logical one. However, how and why it works should be clarified because aesthetics remains as the analogy of reason. Obviously, reason has priority over aesthetics in the aesthetic philosophies of Baumgarten and Kant, and its usefulness is related to value determined on the side of reason.

This makes it difficult for aesthetic activity to establish an educational value by itself. Even though the argument about aesthetics emancipates it and allows it a valid level in the epistemological system, educators who advocate aesthetic education should still ask why aesthetic cognition ought to comply with moral thinking. If abiding by morality were a prerequisite, aesthetic activity alone would not retain educational value. A subsequent but indispensable question is whether aesthetic cognition is common to human beings or not. It is ambiguous even at the initial period, inasmuch as Baumgarten's descriptions (1750, §12) seem to have recognized that an aesthetic approach would be avoidable in terms of assumptions. Yet, if they do not give up the moral goal, human beings face the perfection of sensory cognition as the essential factor of life.

2. Educational implication of aesthetics

Aesthetics, introduced as a neologism, obtains its moral purpose. If it is not, aesthetics will have no place in a system of the philosophies (whether Baumgartner's or Kant's) devoting considerable space to describing moral factors alongside those of beauty. Therefore, the designation of aesthetics itself already connotes educational intention, and accordingly, any separate approach to artistic education would have a passive and limited interpretation even if art were the main object of aesthetics. Solving the epistemological problem is the first aim of the emergence of aesthetics, not solving just any aesthetical problem that art presents.

The educational value or an ontological justification of aesthetic cognition comes strikingly into view with Kant. Although Kant's view of an aesthetics constellated within the whole philosophical system is different from Baumgarten's in its depth and breadth, it is obvious that Kant's statement about its role and corresponding educational implication directly refers to the aesthetic analysis of Baumgarten. Kant illuminates the function of aesthetic judgment while Baumgarten tries to explain what the nature of aesthetics has to be. Kant had a typical and strong teleological view of human beings in terms of purpose. The core of Kant's critical philosophy is obligation. Hence, he was concerned understanding the justification for everything.

Knowing is not a different direction from acting in this perspective. Kant (CPR, B832-B833) insists that "all the interests of my reason, speculative as well as practical, combine in the three following questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope?" Human beings, having reason, can act purposefully so that they assume the purposive combination in the world to be real and to be the result of a particular kind of causality. The third question is open because it is incapable of proof. Hope remains beyond our estimation. Therefore, people tend to know at least why they are doing something but not whether it will succeed.

This kind of human characteristic, existing a priori, does not come from a detailed experience. Although knowing and doing belong to one circle of the

epistemological subject, according to Kant's view, there is a recognizable gap between nature as the object and the free will as the subject. If we had to only follow natural justification, i.e., objective rules, human beings would be no better than machines or natural phenomena and would lack dignity. Even so, if we had only to follow free will, human beings would lack any common sense and fall into chaos. Aesthetic judgments provide a bridge between both sides. More directly expressed, they form the epistemological intercommunity.

That which in the representation of an object is merely subjective, i.e., which decides its reference to the subject, not to the object, is its aesthetical character; but that which serves or can be used for the determination of the object (for cognition), is its logical validity. In the cognition of an object of sense both references present themselves (Kant, CJ, BXLII).

In order to explain the harmonization of the two poles, Kant seems to have taken Baumgarten's concept of aesthetics, which leads to describing the teleological transformation from subjective freedom to objective morality. The aesthetic approach is an inherent process for human judgment even though beauty represents just its representative result. Any concrete feature of beauty cannot be determinable a priori since the subject is constantly bound to seek and ratify it. "There can be no objective rule of taste which shall determine by means of concepts what is beautiful, for every judgment from this source is aesthetical" (Kant, CJ, B53). So, aesthetic judgment promises a dialectical solution to the antinomy of taste through the concept of common sense (Kant, CJ, B65, B237). If music were just free sound beyond our perception or something that stayed isolated from the whole judgment, aesthetic judgment would not need to work in a dialectal fashion.

The Kantian philosophy, including aesthetics, works by forming a total system. The mediation of aesthetic judgment is not an optional cognition separately taking place in artistic activities. A human being's basic and unique quality is the a priori accordance of cognition. This kind of experience does not mean selected occurrences; it covers all human knowledge through experience. Kant demonstrates (CPR, B1) that all our knowledge begins with experience in which "All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then

to the understanding, and ends with reason” (CPR, B730). The only usable method for importing material is sensibility. “Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought” (CPR B75). As mentioned, these two ways cannot stay divided but should meet to produce knowledge. “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their unison can knowledge arise” (CPR, B75). Although all knowledge starts with experience, it does not follow the object of experience but pursues purposiveness in freedom.

Kant’s system shows us two requirements for being human with dignity, namely freedom and purposiveness, but there is a certain dilemma between finality and autonomy. For the sake of constructing a whole philosophical system, Kant uses many paradoxical expressions such as “purposiveness without purpose” (CJ, §15), “conformity to law without a law” (CJ, B69), “disinterested satisfaction” (CJ, §2), etc. The paradoxes allow him to include both sides of antinomies. He further discriminates between judgments through logic and aesthetic. According to Baumgarten, the judgment of taste rests on a priori grounds, as it does also in the Kantian teleological view. Yet, in contrast to Baumgarten’s view, aesthetic judgment for Kant apparently has no purpose. Even the purposiveness without purpose conforms to law. However this characteristic does not mean that aesthetic judgment has to remain inside its own boundary, locked away from reason. Like aesthetic judgment seeking the beautiful, logical judgment pursues the good. The aesthetic stage provides the resolution of the conflict between finality and autonomy because our knowledge starts from the senses to reason. Therefore, beauty becomes a symbol of morality (CJ, §59, also §42).

In order to complete the transition from the beautiful to the good, Kant put one more definition into the aesthetical system, namely concerning the sublime. He uses two more representative expressions of aesthetical judgment besides the beautiful and the sublime to describe the connection, namely pleasant and good. As long as judgment is based on feeling, pleasant serves as a method of processing the next stages (Kant, CJ, B15). The sublime forms a symbiosis

with good. Integrated feeling is related to reason through the faculty of concepts. However, it is still aesthetic, without direct dependence on concepts.

The ground of the sublime in its possible use has to be sought merely in ourselves, while the ground of the beautiful consists in autonomy. In this way, the sublime arranges moral feeling in providing fitness for purposes. This modality of aesthetic judgment is so significant that Kant (CJ, B112) regards it as a main point of his aesthetic philosophy. This systematic approach to developing common value from sensory cognition is the difference from his predecessors' views. For example, Hume (1739) doubted reason as being rational, and Burke (1757) explained the beautiful and the sublime with reference to egoistic judgment.

The beautiful plays a significant role in the transition from an aesthetic experience to morality because it is a constituent in the formation of human cognition and a symbolic messenger for autonomous judgment. Apart from the Kantian classification of the beautiful and the sublime, the subjective necessity of aesthetic judgment is shown to be objective under the presupposition of common sense (Kant, CJ, §22). Indeed, the beautiful is divided into two types, namely free beauty and dependent beauty, which are associated with absolute and conditional truth according to Baumgarten. The sublime takes a hand in the faculty of ideas although it is "incited to abandon sensibility" (CJ, B76). Furthermore, beauty itself already refers to the good even though this kind of unity disturbs the purity of taste judgment (CJ, B51).

Because aesthetic cognition should occur in cognitional activities, there can be no human who is not aesthetical as far as he or she can perceive sensory material with imagination. Consequently, aesthetic judgment aspires toward something good that involves "not merely a claim, but a command for the assent of everyone" (CJ, B114). It is obvious that the main feature of aesthetics in this philosophical system proves to be necessary for incorporating cognitional processes. The possibility of freedom serves only as a common ground of cognition.

Although Kant makes room for pure judgment of taste and consequently for art, the argument is that aesthetic judgment should be practical. Roughly

speaking, the final purpose of human activity, including education, would be happiness, which Kant also concedes. Human activity which follows any cognition, no matter whether it is traditionally artistic or not, should be refined as long as it is to serve a good purpose. Ultimately, freedom meets the moral law under our reason through aesthetical judgment. Aesthetic cognition dealing with artistic matters has already metamorphosed into educational activity in the initial phase of Kant's aesthetic argument. Taste should unify with reason so that the beautiful consequently contains a goal worth pursuing. This a priori dialectic principle is the core instrument by which Kant establishes his critical philosophy reaching the aesthetic to overhaul dichotomies of view, i.e., the subject and the object, the purposiveness and the un-purposiveness, the good and the beauty, knowledge and experience, etc. Without dialectical harmonizing, neither of these dichotomous two does what should be done. In the aesthetical approach toward the good, the antagonism between the rationalist and the sensualist is removed.

IV. The application of aesthetics to education

1. Aesthetic education based on freedom

The Kantian dialectic system still leaves educators to think about a practical justification for public music education. In reference to the feeling of pleasure, the question is how aesthetic judgment could be connected with educational value of society. The cognitional system of a human being harmonizes with the whole purposiveness, but institutional education still needs to have social agreement. Even though our aesthetic judgment should proceed to moral justification by means of reason, is there no other means to force human beings to do this than a priori principle? A prominent early reflection comes from the social and political conception of Schiller, adopting Kant's philosophy. Kant (1803) argues that humans are the only creatures that need to be educated. His view, however, sustains the problem of how to teach autonomy.

Schiller (1794), relying basically on Kant, claims that the aesthetic approach should serve as an educational method to build the ideal “aesthetic state.” He regards freedom as the right way to harmonize nature and reason, i.e., beauty and morality, as with the individual and the state. His argument about aesthetic education urges the use of freedom for education to improve society. “If man is ever to solve that problem of politics in practice he will have to approach it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom” (Schiller, 1794, p. 9). Since the foundation of freedom is beauty, only beauty can make the whole world happy. In this respect, the goal of aesthetic education could be training in any activities that help individuals facilitate free sensory cognition. Eventually, aesthetic education providing freedom through beauty stands out as education, which involves not only its social value but also a happy life.

However, today’s use of aesthetic education as a philosophical approach to music education has diverged from the initial attempts. First, aesthetic is a synonym for artistic so that the original philosophical meaning has abated. Second, the philosophical system of aesthetics is not fully extended so that aesthetic education has become estranged and alienated from the practical side. The former might have connections with the emergence of aesthetic education in Schiller himself and with its revival in the second half of the twentieth century. The latter might pertain to the critical review of aesthetic education, which has become known as the mainstream of music education philosophy in North America.

2. Divergence of aesthetic education from the whole system

Schiller uses the term “aesthetic education” as a means of claiming that his political doctrine describes an ideal society. Even though Schiller refers to Kant, the systematic transition from sensory cognition to moral justification has disappeared in his argument, leaving vague anticipation. Kant gives room to beauty and accordingly for artistic contemplation as we saw previously.

However that is not the whole story, for aesthetic cognition has furthermore to carry over into the whole human judgment so that the freedom of beauty is not the end factor of human activity. As well, to complete the whole purposiveness, aesthetic autonomy functions as a cognate of action's conformity to law. Why does Kant need to set up the ground for aesthetic judgment, the so-called "disinterested satisfaction"? The answer is not that art is the best solution to the problems of human society or even education, but that a priori autonomy could and should apply to practical reasoning to find a suitable problem-solving method. Settling for beauty or stopping at the aesthetic stage alone does not play any role in social development in Kant's view of aesthetics. Schiller probably confuses the "ought" with the "is" and fails to join aesthetics and morality.

According to Kant, against Hume (1739), humans are entitled to achieve perfection, including moral perfection. If our perception terminated at sensory stimuli from which our assumption postulated morality, as Hume claims (1739, p. 246), we would not need to have the term aesthetics, without which our feelings would be blind or aimless. Schiller seems, perhaps involuntarily, to go from a transcendental morality to a skeptical reality. Possibly, this caused Schiller to skip the direct relation of the sublime to morality in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* although Schiller (1790, pp. 103, 167) must have been aware of Kant's concept of the sublime.

Later, Schiller (1793; 1801) postulates the sublime as a Kantian idea, but interprets it somewhat divergently. In passing, he exposes (1801, p. 807) his intention that education should be aesthetic, saying that the sublime must come to the beautiful to realize the goal of aesthetic education. By contrast, Kant (CJ, §23) speaks of the "transition from the faculty which judges of the beautiful to that which judges of the sublime." Schiller changes not only the order of the two judgments but also their priority. In *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, Schiller views play impulse, which is the basic instinct leading to an aesthetic impulse, resonating with the Kantian concepts of pleasure and satisfaction. Insofar as the feeling of the sublime is not a kind of play but is something earnest in the exercise of the imagination (Kant, CJ,

B75; Schiller 1793, p. 509), the transitional moment of Schiller's aesthetic education seems to be at the point of the beautiful, not the sublime or the whole aesthetic system.

Perhaps, as a means of achieving autonomy, Schiller prefers artistic work and its appreciation to human nature. The possibility of describing the sublime in artistic activities may account for his passive attitude about the transition in aesthetic education. According to Schiller, the sublime would be a kind of beauty, while Kant makes the effort to find a link between beauty and morality through the modality of aesthetic judgment. In the Kantian analysis, the sublime ought to concern itself with ideas of reason, which have higher fitness for purpose. Schiller, who gives priority to art, hopes that artistic education, including the concepts of the beautiful and the sublime, could rescue society from chaos. The sublime, however, works not as source or material of any artistic piece but as one of epistemological principles or their stages, in Kant's view. If we follow Schiller's interpretation, we would not need to locate or to work towards the sublime; we could just characterize the beautiful as having potential to awaken us to ideas of reason. However, in the Kantian view (CJ, B120), the beautiful alone cannot attach itself to the good so that reason exerts its force on sensibility.

Schiller's small modification makes all the difference. The sublime as mixed feelings is separated from the imperative, and the moral connections are no more than an effect. The systemic function of aesthetics shrinks. Schiller does not seem to pay much attention to the main conflict of the epistemological limitation that the Kantian first critique concerns. If our aesthetic cognition follows Schiller's view, we lose the ladder from freedom to happiness and just have to hope that freedom works without this guarantee. This looks like a significant loss for future applications of this concept, especially in a music education philosophy.

V. Conclusive discussion

Alperson, in the early 1990s, did not fail to notice that this aspect is significant: “But presumably no human being is utterly without the capability of at least some elementary appreciation of aesthetic qualities. To be totally incapable of aesthetic satisfaction is, we think, to be not fully human” (Alperson, 1991, p. 222). However, Alperson’s statement suggests that other channels for human perception exist. By way of explanation, human beings use multiple systems of sensory cognition, and the aesthetic approach would be a part of heterogeneous systems of perception. Alperson’s assumption (223) that art “might be play with a purpose” would be contradictory to a free play of the beautiful if the transitional characteristic of the aesthetic judgment disappeared. Alperson’s notion (223) that there is “a link between knowledge and desire” would block the transition from artistic behavior to moral action if the senses and the understanding spilt up with each other. In music education, every activity contains already knowledge and facilitates it.

Kant’s intention to handle aesthetics as the mediator between pure reason and practical reason is based on the a priori principles linking human perception to moral action. The main concern is what a human ought to do, not what art is. This is why Kant concentrates on describing much importance of aesthetics only in the third critique after completing the former two books, namely the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Interestingly, Kant’s specific statements about music do not correspond with arguments about the aesthetic stage because the examples already refer to a total result of human cognition including concepts. Kant sets up a theoretical stage of aesthetic judgment, but it cannot obstruct the practical procedure. In Kant’s critical philosophy, any part of the cognitional system and any concrete examples in words would not match precisely due to its ideal totality (Schueller, 1955, p. 219). The systematic procedure, or a part of it, and the outcome of it are not the same thing.

Currently, artists and music educators frequently consider the aesthetic to be only beauty, which has its own territory while Kant integrated the principle of

a priori autonomy with the beautiful and the sublime as well as the good. The focus in the aesthetic philosophy is not on the education of fine feeling but on achieving the happy life through reasoning about morality. Ultimately, we do not need to believe that music would make the world moral. We need only to use music to support moral education. In this sense, there is no better music than that which cares for morality because our aesthetic judgment has the possibility to sublimate beautiful music into a happy life that everyone want to achieve. Music forms from inside us for our sake, not from outside for itself. Therefore, we are the main force, not music; the origin and final of music education is not music but human being.

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[국문초록]

미적 교육으로서의 음악교육에 대한 철학적 관점의 비평적 조망

주 대 창

음악교육철학 분야에서 미적 교육은 가장 중요한 이슈의 하나로 다루어지고 있다. 그러나 그 기원과 철학적 의도에 대해 충분한 검토가 이루어지지 않은 실정이다. 본 연구는 미학을 탄생시킨 바움가르텐, 그것의 목적론적 활용을 추구한 칸트, 그리고 그의 사고를 이어받아 미적 교육이라는 교육적 아이디어를 가시화 한 쉼러를 하나의 철학적 체계 안에서 살펴보았다. 이를 통하여 오늘날 음악교육에서 내세우는 철학적 근거로서의 미적 교육이 본래의 철학적 의도와 일치하지 않으며, 그러한 무의식적 변질이 음악교육의 당위성을 확립하려는 시도에 장애가 될 수 있음을 지적하였다.

※주제어: 음악교육철학, (심)미적 교육, 쉼러, 칸트

투고일: 2014년 2월 28일, 심사(수정): 4월 26일(4월 30일), 게재확정일: 5월 7일